This paper studies the conditions under which intra-elite con ‡ict leads to a democracy. There are two risk averse elites competing for the appropriation of a unit of social surplus, with an ex-ante uncertainty about their future relative bargaining power, and a large non-elite class unable to act collectively. We characterize a democracy as consistng of both franchise extension to, and lowering the cost of collective political activity for, individuals in the non-elite. In the absence of democracy, the stronger elite is always able to appropriate the entire surplus. We show that in a democracy, the newly enfranchised non-elite organize and always prefer to form a coalition with weaker elite against the stronger resulting in a more balanced surplus allocation between the two elites. Accordingly, the elites choose to democratize if they are suf…ciently risk averse. Our formal analysis can account for stylized facts that emerge from a comparative analysis of Indian and Western European democracies.
Introduction
Can a democracy emerge as a solution to intra-elite con ‡ict? Moore (1964) argues that a fundamental precondition for stable democracy is a balance of power between landed upper class and urban bourgeoisie, while totalitarian regimes arise whenever one class dominates the others. Olson (1993) notes: "We can deduce (...) that autocracy is prevented and democracy permitted by the accidents of history that leave a balance of power or stalematea dispersion of force or resources that makes it impossible for any leader or group to overpower all of the others". And Collier (1999) Two examples, drawn from the histories of Indian and French democracy, are a useful illustration of the mechanism emphasized above by Bardhan. In India, Indira Gandhi's attempt to mount a coup (by imposing "Emergency") in 1975 culminated with the lost of the enormous popular support she had hitherto enjoyed. Even though she promised more redistribution to the non elite, this commitment was not credible and an alliance consisting of the non-elite with anti-Congress parties …ercely opposed her by organizing a large mass mobilization (e.g. Kohli (2001) ). 1 In France, universal male su¤rage was introduced in 1848. When a social reform agenda was passed thanks to the alliance between the working class and Republicans, a conservative government disenfranchised 2.8 million of men in 1850. However, in 1851 the Republicans and the working class supported the coup led by Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, who restored the universal su¤rage, initially only formally and from 1868, under the pressure of Republicans and working classes more substantially ( also by abolishing the previously imposed ban on organized political activity (Collier 1999 , pp. 42-43 and Elwitt pp. 41).
Starting from the above observations and examples, we aim to study how a democracy can be an e¤ective device to manage intra-elite con ‡icts.
We analyze a model where two risk averse elites compete for the appropriation of a unit of social surplus, with an ex-ante uncertainty about their future relative bargaining power, and a non-elite class, large but unable to act collectively. Ex-post, after the elites' relative bargaining power is revealed, the stronger elite can appropriate the available surplus in any bilateral bargain, hence neither of the two elites are able to make a credible exante commitment on a balanced ex-post division of social surplus. We show that in a democracy, the newly enfranchised non-elite always organize collectively and always form a coalition with weaker elite in case of disenfranchisement threat. This coalition formation strategy partially balances the relative bargaining power between the two elites, hence the democratization is an ex-ante dominant choice for both the elites if they are su¢ ciently risk averse.
The model emphasizes that the insurance mechanism outlined above is e¤ective only if the non elite is able to act collectively as a group to acquire non-trivial bargaining power, otherwise franchise extension on its own does not alter the balance of power between the two elites. Accordingly, we show that extending the franchise and lowering the cost of political participation (for example by legalizing political parties) for the initially disorganized nonelite are both necessary to solve the non-elite collective action problem and thus to change the democratic surplus allocation.
In our model, collective political activity is organized by a political party who is able to reward its own members selectively. 2 We assume that two elites are already organized along party lines whereas the non-elite are initially disorganized. We model party formation within the non-elite explicitly by allowing each individual in the non-elite the choice of becoming a party member. In our model, joining the party is costly and becomes a dominant strategy for an individual if and only if the number of other individuals joining the party is greater than the critical mass required for e¤ective political activity. Therefore the party formation process has two equilibria, one where all individuals join the party and the second where no individual joins the party.
Which equilibrium do non-elite individuals coordinate on? An individual member of the non-elite contrasts the consequences of not joining the party -with the risk of loosing out from the gains of party membership if a critical mass of other individuals join the party-and the consequences of joining the party -with risk of incurring a privately borne cost if the number of other individuals joining the party falls below the critical mass. The selection argument we use here picks the equilibrium with the lower risk of utility loss. 3 In our model, the cost of joining the party determines the critical mass required for e¤ective political activity. A democracy lowers the required critical mass by lowering the cost of joining the party. This ensures that individuals in the non-elite coordinate on the equilibrium that leads to party formation.
Once the non elite become organized as a group, it strictly prefers to form a coalition with weaker elite in order not to be expropriated by the stronger elite. Thus coalition formation in ex-post bargaining changes the incentives of the stronger elite to renegotiate the surplus allocation achieved by majority voting. In this sense, a democracy endogenously constrains the ability of elites to grab the available social surplus and results in a more balanced surplus allocation between the two elites. Moreover, -since agreements are never binding, even in democracy-the threat of renegotiation and coalition formation by the two 2 Such a commitment to a selective reward, as Olson (1965) originally pointed out, is a common solution to the free-riding problem involved in collective action. 3 We build on the Harsanyi and Selten (1988)'s concept of risk dominance and Young (1993) . One way to gain intuition about our equilibrium selection argument is by relating the party formation process to the stag-hare hunting game (Rousseau, 1754) . Rousseau uses the game to contrast the gains of hunting hare, where the risk of non-cooperation is small and the reward equally small, against the gains of hunting the stag, where maximum cooperation is required and the risk of non-cooperation is greater but the reward is much greater. elites also limits how much of the available surplus the median voter (belonging to the non elite) allocates to herself. When the degree of risk aversion of the two elites is large enough, it is ex-ante payo¤ dominant for both elites to choose democracy essentially for insurance motives.
In conclusion, the mechanism of con ‡ict resolution of the democracy described by our model has two main implications that we think are new in the literature. First in a democracy the freedom of political participation is necessary as the right to vote; the enfranchisement with a high cost of political participation would not change the oligarchic equilibrium allocation. This point is consistent with the observation that all constitutions of the countries commonly considered democratic explicitly recognize freedom of collective organization as well as the universal right to vote (in the last section we provide a sample of the relevant articles concerning freedom of organization). Furthermore, political scientists have documented that in many dictatorships individuals have the right to vote (and often massively participate in elections) without having real freedom of association, 4 and that criteria used to de…ne democracies must include not just the right to vote, but also the existence of e¤ective collective political organizations. 5 Second, the surplus that the median voter belonging to the non elite after the enfranchisement allocates to herself in the democratic equilibrium is bounded by the threat of renegotiation and coalition by the two elites: in fact, it can be very small and can never be too high. This point seems to …nd some support from Aidt, Dutta and Loukoianova 2000) classi…es dictatorship with the elections as "mobilizing dictatorship". In their database, containing observation in the period 1950-90, there are 147 mobilizing over a total of 274 di¤erent dictatorships.
5 E.g. Hermert (1978) and Dahl (1989) . 6 Also De Mello and Tiongson (2003) recently found evidence that more unequal societies tend to spend less rather than more in redistribution. 7 A possible objection to our argument is that stable democracy is not a necessary outcome of intra-elite con ‡ict in heterogenous societies as in many African countries. In an extension to the main model, we consider scenarios where, due to linguistic or ethnic di¤erences, there are vertical links between one elite and a section of the non-elite. With such vertical links, we show that a vertical bias in coalition formation between elites and sections of the non-elite could indeed prevent democratization.
Related Literature
To the best of our knowledge the idea that a democracy represents a solution of the collective action problem faced by the large non elite has never been explicitly formalized. 8 A similar idea is present in the non formal political science literature. For example Epstein (1967, p. 19) already notes that "modern political parties [i.e. di¤erent from a restricted group of friends] emerged with the extension of the vote to a fairly large proportion of the populace". Moreover, our emphasis on the e¤ect democratic institutions, in shaping individual incentives to act collectively is similar to the notion of political opportunity structure in the sociology literature (see e.g. Tilly (1978) , McAdam (1992) , Tarrow (1998) ).
The latter concept is based on the idea that the state with its institution determined the opportunity of the collective action. 9 The notion that for a collective action problem solution is necessary a critical mass of individuals can be traced back in the sociology literature as well (Oliver, Marwel and Teixeira 1985) . Our contribution on this issue is to show how democratization can act as an equilibrium selection device by decreasing this critical mass.
Recently, Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin (2007) addressed the problem of coalition formation and con ‡ict in a non democratic society and analyzed the existence and the characteristic of an ultimate ruling coalition in a context where no binding agreement are feasible.
In our paper, we assume that in a democracy (as well as in an oligarchy) agreements can be renegotiated, allowing us to emphasize the necessity in democracy of party formation with the aim of avoiding renegotiations.
The issue of how constraining are the agreements in a democratic context has been also addressed by , who distinguish between de jure and de facto political power and point out that franchise extension-seen as the allocation of de jure power to working class-can have little impact on economic institutions, given that elites actively invest in holding onto de facto power. In our model, we show that two de 8 Acemoglu and Robinson (2006a) p. 179 provide an informal discussion on the role of political participation in shaping real constraints for the elites in the period in the post enfrachisment period in the UK. 9 For example, Tarow (1998), p. 20, argues that:"contentious Politics emerges when ordinary citizens, (...), responds to opportunity that lowers the cost of collective action, reveal potential allies, show where elites and authorities are most vulnerable and trigger social networks and collective identities into action around common themes". jure agreements (i.e. enfranchisement and parties legalization) can have a real impact-via collective action-on the non elite and weaker elite de facto power. Therefore we emphasize how democratization is more than a de jure act of franchise extension.
The impossibility of exogenously binding agreements in a democratic context also differentiate our paper from the initial contributions on enfranchisement that in the economic literature started with Justman and Gradstein (1999), Robinson (2000, 2001 ), Conley and Temini (2001) , Bertocchi and Spagat (2001) . These papers view the transition to democracy as consisting of franchise extension as a non renegotiable agreement, 10 where the elites commit to relinquish under threat of revolution some power to the non elite.
Other relevant contributions modelling the enfranchisement as an exogenous commit- and it is high when the non elite is able to act collectively.
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The rest of the paper is organized as it follows. In section 2, we present the main model and results. Section 3 analyzes some extensions of the model to analyze when the betweenelites con ‡ict does not lead to democratization. Section 4 is devoted to the discussion, using our model and its results, of comparative historical and institutional evidence relating to India and the pattern of democratization in some Western European countries. Section 5 o¤ers some …nal remarks. Some of the more technical material is contained in the appendix.
The model
We study a three time period (t = 0; 1; 2) model with three classes of homogeneous agents, E 1 ; E 2 ; W , where E i , i = 1; 2, denotes the two elites and W represents the numerically 10 Or it is renegotiable at an exogenously given cost like in Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) . 11 Llavador and Oxoby (2005) and Galor and Moav (2006) are also related. By using a macroeconomic approach, they argue that democratization is the consequence of the interest alignments between social classes, ultimately generated by factors'complementarity and economic growth. large non-elite. The total number of individuals has a mass of 1 + 2 ; the mass of W is equal to 1 and the mass of each elite is equal to ; and 2 < 1: There is a measure of disposable social surplus normalized to one, and the three group compete to appropriate the social surplus; the portion of surplus appropriated by each class is invested to provide a class-speci…c collective good, which is consumed at time 2: Preferences over consumption of the collective good are represented by the smooth utility function u : < + ! < where u 0 (:) > 0 > u 00 (:) i.e. agents are strictly risk averse and payo¤ are normalized so that
The two elites E 1 and E 2 are assumed to be initially organized: each individual in E 1 and E 2 can credibly commit to act collectively and invest the acquired surplus in the collective good for all its members. In contrast, the non-elite W is initially completely disorganized so that no individual in W can commit to act collectively. Only individuals who act collectively are able to appropriate a portion of the disposable surplus since single atomless individuals have no power of surplus extraction against organized group, formed by a positive mass. In order to act collectively, each individual has to join an organization (a party) and we assume that party membership for the non elites has a privately borne participation utility sunk-cost c for each individual. 12 This cost is …xed at time 0 by the elite by legalizing (or even facilitating) the political activity, in a range c 2 (c; 1] , with c 0:
The non elite party can commit to invest in the collective good for its members (exactly like the two organized elites) and exclude the non members from the bene…t of the good. 13 Let W denote a situation where there is a fraction of individuals in W who join the party so that is a measure of the level of organization in W; with higher values of denoting a higher level of organization.
At t = 0, the two elites, by unanimous consent, choose whether democratize or staying in a situation of Oligarchy. In Oligarchy only E 1 and E 2 decide the surplus division by majority voting at time 1. By contrast, democratization implies: a) Enfranchisement of each individual in W , so that she has right to vote at t = 1; b) Legalizing collective political activity for individuals in W by lowering the privately borne cost of party membership to a minimal level c = c.
The relative power of E 1 and E 2 is uncertain at t = 0 and is determined at t = 1 by , a random variable, where
The interpretation is that when = i, elite E i can appropriate the entire unit of disposable surplus in any bilateral bargain with E j and with W 1 : 14 In the appendix, we endogenize the bargaining power by deriving it from the disagreement point that can be seen as the surplus one group can appropriate in case of civil war. 15 The variable q can be interpreted as an index of power between the two elites, so that when q = , then in section 3.2, we study the consequences of relaxing this assumption.
Some notation is now necessary. Let denote the set of all admissible coalitions between E 1 ; E 2 and W; excluding the grand coalition. 16 For each 2 , let ( ) denote the set of admissible coalitions which excludes any class already contained in : 17 We assume that in any process of bargaining between two classes or between a class and a coalition of classes, the outcome is determined by a grabbing function g( ; 0 ; ) measuring the share of the available surplus is able to extract in a bilateral bargain with 0 2 ( ) given . For 2 , 0 2 ( ), the interpretation is that in any bilateral bargain, bargaining power is equivalent to the amount of the available surplus that can grab relative to 0 ; clearly,
18 14 Our results would not change qualitatively if we partially relax this assumption by allowing both W 1 and E j to extract some surplus from the strongest elite, as long as this amount is small enough. 15 Therefore, one can think at as a shock increasing the value of the production factor owned by one elite (like an increase of oil price or a dramatic factor intensive technological shocks), so that the elite blessed by nature can then use this wealth to acquire guns or hire an army in order to extract the social surplus. 16 More formally: = ffW g ; fE 1 g ; fE 2 g ; fW ; E 1 g ; fW ; E 2 g ; fE 1 ; E 2 gg 17 Formally, for any two classes i; j 2 , ( ) = f 0 2 : i = 2 0 or j = 2 0 g. 18 We di¤er from standard models of coalition formation in that the payo¤ to a member of a coalition is determined by a process of bargaining. In the main text, we treat the grabbing function g( ; 0 ; ) as a Moreover, we will assume that the more organized W is (i.e. the larger ), the higher is its bargaining power against the weaker elite and the bargaining power of the coalition between weaker elite and non elite-both g (fW ; E j g ; E i ; i) and g(W ; E j ; i) are increasing in :
Moreover, note that our above assumptions implies lim !0 g(W ; E j ; i) = 0.
We assume that at time t = 0 it is not possible to make binding agreements over surplus division, which will then depend on the ex-post bargaining relative power between classes and coalitions.
At t = 1, the relative bargaining strength of the two elites becomes common knowledge.
The pool of enfranchised individuals (everybody in democracy, only the elite in oligarchy), by majority voting, decide a surplus allocation for each of the three classes.
At t = 2, either one of the two elites on their own or any other coalition of classes may reject the voting outcome and renegotiate the surplus allocation determined by majority voting at t = 1. Consumption takes place at the end of t = 2:
In the next section, we solve this model by backward induction.
Renegotiation and coalition formation at t = 2
At t = 2, after the outcome of majority voting is rejected the renegotiation phase takes place. If no non-elite party formation took place at t = 1, i.e. = 0; the payo¤ distribution at t = 2 is trivial: the stronger elite E i obtains 1, E j and each member of W obtain 0.
Next we consider if at time 1 there was party formation, > 0. Note that at this time, the order by which the groups or coalition of groups bargain between each other change according to the identity of the group or coalition rejecting the democratic outcome. 19 As primitive; however, in the appendix, we endogenize this grabbing function via a process of recursive Nash bargaining where the power of a class or coalition of classes is determined by the surplus each group or coalition is able to appropriate in case of civil war. 19 More in details:
1. If a single class has objected, the two classes who did not object decide whether or not to form a coalition. If no coalition is formed, the objecting class bargains …rst with one and then with the other, and each class has an equal probability of being the …rst.
2. If two classes form a coalition to reject the winning proposal, …rst, the coalition bargains with the excluded class and then, bargain with each other over the surplus appropriated in the preceding it will be clear in what follows, the …nal payo¤s are independent on whom rejected the democratic outcome.
Let f ( ) denote the …nal surplus W is able to appropriate after forming a coalition with E j against E i and then bargaining with E j on its own, or
Given assumptions (1) f ( ) is increasing in ; note moreover that lim !0 f ( ) = 0.
Given that g(E i ; W 1 ; i) = 1, no individual (whether or not a party member) in W will obtain any share of the available surplus if it joins a coalition with the stronger elite. 20 Therefore neither W nor E j will form a coalition with the stronger elite E i: On the other hand, if > 0, each party member in W will have an incentive to form a coalition with E j ; and E j will have an incentive to form a coalition with W .
It follows that when > 0, the payo¤ to E i is 1 g (fW ; E j g ; E i ; i), the payo¤ to E j is g ( ) = g (fW ; E j g ; E i ; i) g(E j ; W ; i) and the payo¤ each individual in W is f ( ): Hence, whoever objected the democratic outcome (i.e. (W ) given that W alone will never have incentive to reject his own decision), there will always be a coalition formed by E j and W; …rst bargaining against E i ; and then splitting the grabbed surplus among each other in a post coalition bargaining.
As the degree of organization only a¤ect payo¤s at the renegotiation stage, at time 2, the payo¤ to each individual in W belonging to the party of size is u(f ( )) c while the payo¤ from not joining the organization is 0. As u(0) = 0 and u(:) is continuous and
Moreover, as u 0 (:) > 0, and f ( ) is continuous and increasing in , u(f ( )) is also continuous and increasing in .
Therefore, assuming that c is su¢ ciently small, so that
which represents a necessary condition for the party formation in W: 21 There will always round of bargaining.
be a function^ (c); implicitly de…ned as u(f (^ )) = c, such that it is a dominant action for each individual in W to join the party if and only if >^ (c). Let us de…ne^ (c) a critical mass and we note that since^ 0 (c) > 0 , the elites can ex-ante decrease c; and therefore the critical mass for the party formation, by legalizing the political activity.
Equilibrium enfranchisement
In this section, we study: (i) surplus division at t = 1, the voting stage; (ii) the ex-ante decision of individuals in W to form a party at t = 0; (iii) the ex-ante decision of the two elites to extend democracy at t = 0.
Voting at t = 1
W denote a surplus sharing rule where E i (respectively, E j ) is the portion of the surplus appropriated by E i (respectively, E j ) and W is the portion of the surplus appropriated by W . If there is no democracy, = 0 and the only possible surplus division is E i = 1, E j = W 0 = 0 as any other division will be rejected by the strongest elite. With democracy, the median voter is in W and the winning sharing
either of the two elites will object and following such an objection, W will form a coalition with E j and obtain f ( ).
It is important to note that both the voting stage and the enfranchisement of W are necessary to guarantee a di¤erent surplus allocation than in the oligarchy, in spite of the fact that the democratic surplus division mirrors the renegotiation payo¤s. If the two elites legalize W 0 s organization but do not extend franchise, there will not be party formation in equilibrium. Assume on the contrary that > 0. Then, the equilibrium surplus sharing
would be E i = 1 g ( ), E j = g ( ) and W = 0 as surplus division will exclude the non-elite while ensuring that the weaker elite will extract g( ) by threatening to form a coalition with W at the renegotiation stage but ex-ante no individual in W would ever join the organization since W = 0.
Party formation at t = 0
Recall that any member of W can join the organization at cost c; and that (a) if an in the post coalition game. Since c can be chosen arbitrarily small or even 0, the amount of surplus that the non elite can extract can be arbitrarily small, but strictly positive.
individual in W believes that a fraction > (c) will join the party, it is dominant for him to join as well, (b) if he believes that there is fraction < (c) joining the party, then it is a dominant action for him not to join as well.
In a democracy, collective political organization is legal and any member of W can join the organization at cost c; with^ (c) representing the critical mass in democracy. Note that in democracy there are two symmetric equilibria in the collective action game being played by individuals in W : one where no individual in W joins the party and another where every individual in W will join the party.
Which of these two equilibria prevail? We develop an equilibrium selection argument that selects the prevailing equilibrium as a function of c, the cost collective political activity with enfranchisement. Speci…cally, we show that without enfranchisement, the no party equilibrium is selected while with enfranchisement, the party equilibrium is selected.
Lemma 1 In the party formation game played by individuals in W , the equilibrium where everybody joins the party is selected if and only if^ (c) < according to either equilibrium, under the assumption that other individuals make a small mistake with some small probability and choose their own actions optimally. The selected equilibrium is the one which is relatively more robust to individual mistakes namely the one with a larger basin of attraction. Therefore, when^ (c) is small, individuals converge on the equilibrium where all individuals join the party. In the language of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) , the selected equilibrium is risk-dominant.
Finally note that^ (c) is an increasing function of c; and therefore, the condition that
can be equivalently stated as a condition that c is low enough. The following lemma summarizes the above discussion: Proposition 1 . If the cost of joining a party in democracy, c; is su¢ ciently low, all individuals in W will join the party anticipating coalition formation with the weaker of the two elites at the renegotiation stage and a share f ( ) at the voting stage.
Furthermore, always using lemma 1 and considering the above discussion we can state the following:
Proposition 2 Both lowering the cost of joining the party to a level c such that^ (c) < and the enfranchisement are necessary to achieve a surplus sharing di¤erent than the one in oligarchy.
Proof. We already argued above-during the illustration of the voting stage-the necessity of extending the franchise. Now, let us consider an hypothetical situation where two elites extend franchise but do not lower the cost of joining the organization, so that c :^ (c) > .
Given lemma 1 = 0 and the surplus allocation would be E i = 1, E j = W 0 = 0 : the enfranchisement of W; on its own has no real e¤ect since any decision who attribute an allocation di¤erent than the one in oligarchy would be rejected by the stronger elite and renegotiated.
Democracy at t = 0
Next, we study the choice of democracy at t = 0. To simplify notation, let f (1) f and g(1) g. As the two elites are identical ex-ante, both of them will agree to a democracy if and only if the inequality holds:
We can therefore state Proposition 3 A necessary condition for E 1 and E 2 to democratize is that both elites are risk-averse. When both elites are risk-averse and f is small enough (relative to the degree of risk-aversion of u(:)), the transition to democracy is Pareto e¢ cient. .
Proof. See appendix.
Consider the case where individuals are risk neutral. In this case, as there are no gains from risk-sharing and f > 0, the expected utility of either elite at t = 0 (before their relative bargaining power is revealed) in oligarchy is higher than the expected utility in democracy. However, when elites are risk averse, there is a net gain in having a smoother consumption pattern across the two states, therefore, when f is not too large relative to degree of risk-aversion, the expected utility in Democracy could well be strictly higher than the expected utility in Oligarchy.
Furthermore, we note that the equilibrium democratic allocation is E i = 1 g f , E j = g and W = f and that the only requirement for f is to be strictly positive (by assumption 2), i.e. f can be in…nitesimally small. This implies that in our model the surplus allocated to the non elite in democracy can in principle be very small.
Discussion
What is the role of the timing of organization formation in obtaining our main result?
We have assumed that individuals in W form a organization at t = 0 before the elites know their own relative bargaining power. We argue that no other timing makes sense and given the choice of when to form a organization, organization formation will take place at t = 0. Suppose organization formation takes place after elites know their relative bargaining strength. Then, the stronger elite will always have an incentive to increase c in order to prevent organization formation and thus coalition formation between the weaker elite and individuals in W . In our model, the cost c of organization membership is a sunk cost and organization members pay it only once at the time the organization is formed. What in e¤ect, we are assuming, is that the stronger elite will …nd too costly to break-up an existing organization already formed at t = 0: if it doesn't then, of course, the organization in W will be broken up and democratization will reversed. Therefore, given the choice of when to form a organization, organization formation will take place at t = 0.
Is our main result robust to repeated interaction between competing elites?
On the face of it, folk theorem type arguments suggest that repeated interaction between competing elites in Oligarchy, should lead to e¢ cient risk sharing between elites. However, there are at least two reasons why a folk theorem type argument may not apply here. First, the discount factor may be bounded away from 1 because, for instance, the gap between successive rounds of play (in our model, in Oligarchy, a round of play would have an exante stage and ex-post stage of coalition formation and bargaining) is large. Second, the strategy pro…les that support risk-sharing between elites may not be renegotiation-proof.
Indeed, in our paper, there is a single e¢ cient risk-sharing allocation between the two elites namely that at each value of , each elite appropriates half the social surplus in each round of play. Notice that for a strategy pro…le to be renegotiation proof, it would have to result in the e¢ cient allocation after any history of play. However, any strategy pro…le that supports e¢ cient risk-sharing along the equilibrium path of play must involve some payo¤ loss for the stronger elite in the continuation game that follows on from the history where the stronger elite reneges on e¢ cient risk-sharing, a contradiction.
Elite con ‡ict without democracy
In this section, in contrast to the preceding analysis, we examine two di¤erent scenarios where intra-elite con ‡ict doesn't necessarily lead to democratization: vertical biases in coalition formation and dominant elites.
Ethnic con ‡ict
As already argued in the introduction, intra-elite con ‡ict doesn't necessarily lead to stable democracy, especially when decolonization generates states that are populated by di¤erent social groups characterized by strong vertical links (like ethnic and linguistic links). In what follows, we show that with vertical bias, the conditions for democracy to emerge in equilibrium, derived in the preceding two sections, need to be quali…ed.
We model ethnic groups and ethnic con ‡ict as follows. Assume that W is partitioned into subgroups W 1 and W 2 , such that each individual in W i is that gets a negative utility b i , where b i > 0, whenever it forms a coalition with elite E j ; otherwise, (for example, if it doesn't form a coalition, or if it forms a coalition with elite E i , j 6 = i), b i = 0. We assumed that individuals have incentive to act collectively when anticipating a coalition with the weaker elite, u(f ) > c. However, if u(f ) < c: + b i , for all c 2 fc; cg, clearly no individual in W i will form a coalition with E j ; and, assuming that the size of group W i is greater than half, then for = i; the fraction of individuals who act collectively is less than 1 2 and therefore, there will be no organization formation in W , no ex-post coalition formation and consequently, no ex-ante democracy. Moore (1964) observes that the presence of a dominant elite results in dictatorship, not democracy. One way to model a dominant elite in our setting is to let the ex-ante probability that = 1 be q 1 2 . In other words, the two elites are not ex-ante symmetric in the sense that there is a bias in the probability with which one of the two elites become dominant.
Dominant elites
In such a situation, even when we maintain the assumptions under which Proposition 1 is valid, as long as q close enough to 1, there will be no unanimous agreement to extend democracy. The relevant inequality that needs to be satis…ed for the dominant elite to agree to democracy is
and as f > 0, when q = 1, the direction of inequality (4) will be reversed and by continuity, this reversal will persist when q is close to 1. Of course, at the other extreme, when q is close to 1 2 , by continuity if (3) holds as a strict inequality so will (4). Moreover, as the LHS of (4) is increasing in q and the RHS of (3) is monotone in q, there is a q > 1 2 and q < 1, such that when, (3) holds while when q > q, the direction of the inequality is reversed.
Some empirical patterns
In this section we provide and discuss empirical evidence that supports the formal analysis developed here. To this end, it is useful to state four patterns that emerge from our formal analysis:
1. In the absence of ethnic bias, intra-elite con ‡ict between equally powerful elites is a precondition for the transition to democracy;
2. Democracy lowers the cost of, and promotes, political activity; . In these papers, the transition to democracy is driven by class complementarity or interest alignment between sections of the elite and non-elite, which follows the modern capitalistic development. In contrast, in our paper, neither technological change nor a di¤erent mix of production factors are needed to generate the coalition among classes leading democracy. Therefore from our model pattern 4 emerges, in the sense that economic development in itself is neither a su¢ cient nor a necessary element for the emergence of democracy. 22 Accordingly, in this section we argue that this pattern (as well as the other 3 listed above) has some empirical anecdotal support.
Pattern 1: Intra-elite con ‡ict and coalitions
Collier ( In what follows we analyze, in detail, some of these cases and also the establishment of democracy to India, a case that has received surprisingly little attention from the literature.
European Countries
There is some agreement among historians and political scientists that the elites in 22 This is not to say that development and democracy are completely unrelated. In our model democracy and development can be linked by the fact that economic development can be associated with the rise of strong industrial elite able to compete with traditional rural landowning. aristocracy.
Britain had con ‡icting interests. Olson (1993) traces the origin of such fragmentation in the English civil war in the 17th century and writes. "There were no lasting winners in the English civil wars. The di¤erent tendencies in British Protestantism and the economic and social forces with which they were linked were more or less evenly matched". The political environment after the Glorious Revolution led to the competition between rural aristocracy and industrial capital (Olson 1993 ), which paved the way for franchise extension in the midNineteenth century. Moore (1966) claims instead that this division was the result of the British capitalistic evolution, where part of the landed upper class and the gentry who transformed themselves into capitalists generated a di¤erent and equally strong elite, the upper bourgeoisie. 23 The British parliament prior to 1832 was dominated either directly or indirectly by the big landlords. The 1832 Reform act established the right to vote based uniformly on property and income. It extended franchise to 14% of male population, roughly the entire middle class (Smellie 1949 and Collier 1999) . The 1832 act gave the de jure power to a section of the economic elite who were unrepresented under existing electoral arrangements.
We may argue that it avoided the alliance between bourgeoisie and working class that 44 years before leaded in France to the revolution. Accordingly, the landscape after the reform of 1832 was the one described by our model with two con ‡icting elites, who -represented in the parliament by the Conservatives and the Liberals-agreed to extend, with the largely bipartisan reform of 1867, franchise to a large part of the working class, a task that was completed by the reform in 1888 when about 60% of male adult were enfranchised. 
42-43 and Elwitt pp. 41).
Unlike France and Britain, Italy, Germany and Japan did not pass through historical episodes that weakened the traditional aristocracy and created conditions leading to intraelite competition. In fact, the landed aristocracy was strengthened by their involvement in reuni…cation process both in Germany and in Italy and by prestigious external military victories in Japan. Therefore, in all these three countries, the landed aristocracy was still dominant in the second half on nineteenth century. The oligarchic structure in Italy, Germany and Japan was mainly achieved through an incorporation of a weak bourgeoisie in an authoritarian state, and the landed aristocracy was still hegemonic in this alliance "...a commercial and industrial class which is too weak and dependent to take the power elections. Both at the state level and at the centre, governments have always been elected by people with a reasonably high level of rotation among political organizations. 25 As it has been extensively documented, India enjoys a free media, freedom of assembly and association.
The decision to extend the franchise was voted unanimously by the constituent assembly, which also declared India an Independent state. The constituent assembly was elected via a process of indirect elections, organized in provincial legislatures elected in early 1946, using the 1935 act of franchise, mainly based on landowning. The electors constituted about 10 percent of the entire population (Sarkar 2001) . Therefore, the constituent assembly can be considered to be representative of the elites and franchise extension in India was a one-shot decision rather than a dynamic process.
At the onset of the constituent assembly, the elites were constituted by large landowners and the industrial urban class often in con ‡ict within each other. These divisions were already present in the Mogul's era but they were further exacerbated by the English rulers, who implemented the policy of "divide and rule", trying to prevent the formation of any coalition that could represent a threat . British rulers favoured and rested mainly on the support of Indian rural upper classes: native princes and large landlords. 26 In contrast, British colonialism did not favour Indian commercial and industrial elites, to prevent competition with their English counterparts who, for long time, sought protection, subsidy, and opportunities for monopolistic exploitation of the Indian market (Moore 1966, pp 371 ). This bias toward rural elites alienated the commercial and professional class generated a clear split between rural and urban elites in India. Accordingly, the British strategy resulted in the fact that the urban elite did not form a coalition with the powerful landed aristocracy, in a fashion which generated the dictatorial drift in Japan, Italy and Germany. The con ‡ict between urban intellectual elites and rural big and medium farmers is a common element present in the history of Indian Democracy.
In this respect India di¤ered from Pakistan. Geographically, Pakistan consists of regions 25 Although the Congress has traditionally been the dominating force, in 1977 it is thrown out. In 1980 it was voted back and in 1989 elections it was voted out again. In 1991, the Congress came back to power again. 26 In the most important court there was a British resident advisor.
which-during British colonialism-were characterized by mainly rural economy, dominated by Muslim Punjabi landlords. 27 The Punjabi elites, consisting mainly of the landed aristocracy (e.g. Kohli, 2001 , pp. 5) were the core of the Muslim League who decided the constitutional design of the country, and obtained partition from the rest of India. Although the creation of Pakistani democracy was contemporaneous with Indian democracy, it has never been stable with four major military coups (1958, 1969, 1977, 1999) .
The following episode is a useful illustration of the coalition dynamics underlined in our model. Indira Gandhi's attempt to mount a coup (by imposing "Emergency") in 1975
culminated with the lost of the enormous popular support she had hitherto enjoyed and indeed, she called and lost elections in 1977. Even though she promised more redistribution to the non elite, this commitment was not credible and an alliance consisting of the non-elite with anti-Congress parties opposed her. 28 The degree of ethnic con ‡ict in India has always been less serious than for example in African countries. The fact that the Congress organization and the coalition of organizations in power at the central government during the di¤erent legislatures are not organized on an ethnic basis supports this claim (Horowitz 1985) . Indeed, we showed that if part of non elites say W i , have ethnic linkages with part of the elites E i ; and for these reasons W i has some non monetary disutility b i in allying with E j ; j 6 = i, democracy will not emerge in equilibrium when b i is large. The lower level of inter-ethnic con ‡ict in Indian society is perhaps due to the geographic dispersion of Indian ethnic groups, which made them economically complementary and lower the level of b. And perhaps due to sanskritisation and castes institutions, which to a certain extend re ‡ect horizontal divisions rather than vertical ethnic-type division. On the contrary, when di¤erent ethnic groups are concentrated in di¤erent regions of the country, it is more likely that non-elites will not ally horizontally with each other, but prefer to ally vertically with the elites of the same ethnic group.
In Nigeria after independence three essentially ethnic organizations had emerged: the Northern People's Congress (NPC) drawing its support from the Hausa and Fulani tribes of the North, the Action Group (AG), drawing its support from the Yoruba tribes of West- 27 Until 1971, the presence of a Bengali-muslim population in Pakistan generated a con ‡ict with the west Pakistani majority, but their political power has always been small (Rashiduzzaman 1982) . In 1971, the Bengali minority, with the help of India, obtained their independence with the formation of Bangladesh. 28 Kohli (2001) notes: "The fact that she was voted out of power following the emergency only con…rm the e¢ cacy of Indian democracy". ern Nigeria, and the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) relying on the support of the Igbo of Eastern Nigeria. This clear regional divide was inherited from the British colonial period, where the South East, the South West and the North administrations were in practice ruled as fully independent units. 29 Interestingly, community identities were so strong in shaping economic participation and social di¤erentiation that a clear divide between classes did not emerge (Forrest pp. 24, 1993) . Furthermore, we note that these three macro-regions are still today economically autonomous entities, predominantly agrarian in terms of employed labor force (more than 70 percent). The two rainy southern regions is where, historically, the production of staple tree and root crops is concentrated while the drier north is where the production of grains is concentrated (Olaloku et al. 1979 ).
The vertical ethnical division resulted, in Nigeria, in a series unstable democratic regimes. The …rst elections held in Nigeria in 1959 saw the victory of the NPC, which after one year declared the state of emergency in the western region whose local government, leaded by the AG, was proscribed and its leader arrested. The non elites, did not reject this outcome and instead of turning compact against the elites who disenfranchised them, they split along the ethnic and geographic lines, which lead the country to a long civil war that lasted until 1970 (Ake 1985).
Pattern 2: The cost and organization of political activity
It is quite incontroversial that democracy does not prevent and, on the contrary, encourages collective political activity. The constitutions of all main democracies dedicate one important article to the freedom of association or (/and) organization formation. In what follows we provide a sample consisting of the oldest and largest democracies.
Canada: constitution act article 2 point d, guarantees freedom of association.
France: article 4 (Title I) states "Political organizations and groups shall contribute to the exercise of su¤rage. They shall be formed and carry on their activities freely (...)". 29 The nationalistic party that after the independence forced the creation of a single state. 30 Taken literally, our model explains the formation of a single party for the non elites, but this is only the result of simplifying assumptions. In principle, non-elite can organize themselves in di¤erent bodies and also by joining preexisting parties, this would not change the nature of our results to the extent that the resulting organizations successfully coordinate to mobilize the non-elites in case of disenfranchisement threats.
In France, the elections in 1848 under manhood universal su¤rage, prompted the formation of the …rst mass organization, Republican Solidarity. This organization established branches in sixty-two of Frances's eighty-six departments and rapidly acquired about thirtythousand members in 353 branches and it was formed by bourgeois, petty bourgeois and working class (Aminzade .1993, pp. 29-32) . 31 Interestingly, Luis Napoleon during the initial repressive years of his regime declared Republican Solidarity illegal, but he never restricted su¤rage. Republican Solidarity then almost disappeared, but it was revived with success in 1868, when Napoleon restored the formal democracy by removing the ban to any form of collective political activity.
India
The mass mobilization in India is a more complicated phenomenon than in the western 
Pattern 3: The weak median voter European Countries
A necessary condition for the democratization is that the ability of the working class to extract surplus is limited and that the organized working class on its own is weak (and becomes powerful only if allied with one elite). This is clearly consistent with Przeworski (1997) who notes:
"Here it may be worth noting that democratic system was solidi…ed in Belgium, Sweden, France and Great Britain only after organized workers were badly defeated in mass strikes and adopted a docile posture as a result.," (Przeworski (1997, p. 133) In the UK, the enfranchised classes represented in the parliament by the Conservatives and the Liberals agreed to extend, with the reform of 1867, franchise to a large part of the working class, a task that was completed by the reform in 1888 when about 60% of male adult were enfranchised. In general this second wave of enfranchisement does not seem to be due to the strength of the working class. On the contrary, there is some agreement that the working class in England was too weak to represent a serious threat as Lizzeri and Persico (2004) Weiner's observations are supported by Figure 4 , depicting the index of wealth concentration and relative poverty in India from 1946-the date of the constituent assembly, which allowed for universal su¤rage-to the early 1990s. 32 We can observe that income inequality and relative poverty has no downward tend-little or no redistribution has taken place. 33 Altogether, the funds allocated for the three main antipoverty programs constituted only the 4% of the total allocation in the plan where this project took place. The policy after independence mainly favoured agrarian, industrial and professional urban elites. The agrarian reform was not redistributive; there was a transfer of ownership from absentee landlords to enterprising rich farmers, who bene…ted also from policy of price 32 Gini index and last income quintile: Deininger and Squire, High quality Dataset. GDP per capita growth: Penn Table. 33 Deininger and Squire, High quality Dataset. 34 Brass 1990. 35 Barro and Lee Dataset.
support, subsidized inputs and institutional credits (Bardhan pp. 46 1988 ). 36 Substantial help was also addressed to industrialists, mainly from a few top Western Indian business families, with strong protectionist policies of import substitution, trade restriction, and large public provision of capital goods, intermediate goods, infrastructural facilities for private …rms often at arti…cially low prices . Also the professionals and high level bureaucrats were favoured by the government policy. In a country were the illiteracy is so widespread, this class bene…ted from educational expenditure. In India, total expenditure on education has been generally lower than comparable developing countries and a disproportionate share of the education budget has gone into higher education and to provide grants-in-aid to private schools with very little left for primary education (Weiner 1999, pp. 214 ). This policy favoured the educated urban classes by helping their children for secondary education and maintaining their monopoly as human capital owners (Bardhan, 1988 pp. 52).
There is a high level of fragmentation of lower castes. The caste system was an institutional way to organize this fragmentation, but at the same time, it perpetrated these divisions. A proof of this political weakness is represented by the general weakness of the Communist organizations in India. They have never been strong at a central level, and, when they gained power at the state level, as in West Bengal, they have always supported moderate policies of redistribution rather than dramatic change in the economic system. Therefore, we can argue that Indian lower classes would never be able to have an high level of bargaining power on its own (i:e:f is su¢ ciently small).
Pattern 4: Growth and democracy
Is democracy linked to industrial development? The evidence on this issue is moot. There is a relatively old debate on the so-called "modernization theory" that democratization naturally follows the development process. This was initially fuelled by an article of Lipset 
Final Remarks
The following quote is a good way of summarizing our main result: In particular, our model clari…es how democracy can be seen as a negotiation device by which competing elites ensure a mutually fair share of the surplus by handing formal power to a weak non-elite median voter.
Possible directions for future research include investigating, more generally, voting models with an endogenously weak median voter, understanding the provision of and funding of public goods with a weak median voter and studying the link between secessionist movements and democratic institutions. 37 Other contributions such as Barro (1999) 
Proof of lemma 1
We use the idea of a stochastically stable equilibrium developed by Young (1993) (see also Charness and Jackson (2007) ). Let g be an arbitrary …nite normal form game with a set of N players, an action set A i for each player and a payo¤ function u i :
Suppose each player believes that whenever any other player chooses to play a speci…c action, with probability ", 0 < " < 1, she ends up choosing some other action in A i . Let g(") denote the perturbed game. A state in g(") is a pro…le of actions. For each state, let each player pick a best response to that state in g("). Associated with each best-response is a function from the set of states to itself. When " is small enough, let the set of 0 s that remain best responses for all smaller " be denoted by A(g). Any 2 A(g), together with " de…nes a Markov process over the set of states that is both irreducible and aperiodic and therefore has a unique steady-state distribution. A stochastically stable state is one which has positive probability under the limit of the steady state distribution of the preceding Markov process as " goes to zero for any selection 2 A(g). If a state is both a Nash equilibrium of g and a stochastically stable, then it is said to be a stochastically stable equilibrium of g.
As matters stand, we can't apply, in a straightforward way, the de…nition of a stochastically stable equilibrium to select between the two equilibria in the coordination game played by non-party members in W . The reason for this is that there is a continuum of individuals, of unit measure, in W while the de…nition of stochastic stability presupposes a game with a …nite number of players. Instead, we take a sequence of …nite subsets of players in W (equivalently, a …nite grid contained in the unit interval) whose limit is W (equivalently, whose limit is the unit interval). LetÑ j , j 1; be a sequence of …nite grids contained in the unit interval so that lim j!1Ñj = [0; 1]. Let N j = #Ñ j . We call a sequence of …nite grids admissible if (i) there is a threshold N j for each j such that lim j!1
the payo¤ to a party member is u(f ) c if the number party members is greater than or equal to N j and is c otherwise, (iii) the payo¤ to a non-party member is zero. For an equilibrium to be stochastically stable in the coordination game played by individuals in W , it must be the limit of the sequence of stochastically stable equilibria of all admissible sequences of …nite grids converging to the unit interval.
Fix j and considerÑ j . For" small enough, if at least N j individuals join the party, then the best response of each non-party member must be to choose join the party as well.
Similarly, if at most N 1 join the party, then the best response of each non-party member must be to join the party. Let #N p j be the number of party members. In states where #N p j = N j 1, choosing either of the two options, join the party or not join the party, are possible best responses for an individual. It follows that that best responses di¤er only in states where #N p j = N j 1. Now, consider the associated Markov process for small ". There are two recurrent communication classes 38 , one where all individuals choose to join the party (labelled a 1 ) and one in which all individuals choose not to join the party (labelled a 2 ). By Theorem 4 in Young (1993) , only states in a recurrent communication class with least resistance will have positive probability weight in the limit of the steady state distribution of the Markov process as" goes to zero. Consider the state a 2 . Then, (i) there is a best response selection such that given N j N j + 2 errors, the best response of each individual is to be in a 1 and (ii) there is a best response selection such that given N j N j + 1 errors, the best response of each individual is to be in a 1 . Therefore, the minimum resistance of leaving the state a 2 , depending on the selection made, is either N N + 1 or N N + 2. It follows that the minimum resistance of a tree oriented from the state a 2 to the state a 1 , depending on the best response selection made, is either N j N j +1
or N j N j + 2. Next, consider the state a 1 . Then, (i) there is a best response selection such that given N j 1 errors, the best response of each individual is to be in a 2 and (ii) there is a best response selection such that given N j 2 errors, the best response of each individual is to be in a 2 . Therefore, the minimum resistance of leaving the state a 1 , depending on the best response selection is either N j 1 or N j 2. It follows that the minimum resistance of a tree oriented from the state a 1 to the state a 2 , depending on the best response selection made, is also either N j 1 or N j 2. The state a 1 is the unique stochastically stable equilibrium if and only if both N j N j + 1 < N j 1 and N j N j + 2 < N j 2 or equivalently, both N j > N j +2 2
and N j > N j +4 2 . As
, the state a 1 is the unique stochastically stable equilibrium. Rewriting these inequalities, it follows that state a 1 is the unique stochastically stable equilibrium if and only if , the 38 For the de…nition of the terms "recurrent communication classes", "resistance" and "minimum stochastic potential" in this proof, see Young (1993) . unique stochastically stable equilibrium is one where all non-party members do not join the party or equivalently, when^ (c:) < 1 2 , the unique stochastically stable equilibrium is one where all non-party members join the party.
Proof of Proposition 3
Inequality (3) is equivalent to
When both elites are risk-neutral i.e. u 00 (:) = 0, by computation, it follows that as 1
(1 g f ) = g + f > g, the direction of the inequality (3) is always reversed. Therefore, risk-aversion is a necessary condition for equilibrium enfranchisement. However, when u 00 (:) < 0, as 1 (1 g) = g and 0 < g,
and therefore, as long as f is small enough, (3) will hold.
Endogenising the grabbing function
We show how the grabbing function can be endogenously derived as the outcomes of a process of sequential bilateral Nash bargains, where …rst, a coalition of two classes bargains with a class and second, given the surplus appropriated at the proceeding stage, each class in the coalition bargains with each other. 
